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DID THE MARKMAN COURT IGNORE
FACT, SUBSTANCE, AND THE SPIRIT OF
THE CONSTITUTION IN ITS RUSH
TOWARD UNIFORMITY?
No more important nor contentious an issue arises in pat-
ent law jurisprudence than the appropriate role of juries in
patent litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of claim construction2 for patent infringement fo-
cused the controversy concerning the jury's role with two distinct
lines of federal circuit cases: one requiring the jury to determine
underlying factual disputes3 and the other reserving claim con-
struction exclusively with the court.4 In a landmark decision,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.5 the Supreme Court af-
firmed a controversial decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC), holding that claim construction is a mat-
ter of law exclusively within the province of the court.6
Markman emerges as a champion among the skeptics who
1. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
2. Claim construction involves interpreting what the patent defines as the in-
vention's scope or boundaries. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). For background infor-
mation concerning patent terminology, development, and their relationship to the
Seventh Amendment, see infra Part II.
3. The term "underlying factual disputes" refers to whether a factual question
must be resolved by fact finding prior to claim construction. See infra Part IV.A.1.
4. Compare McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(stating that claim construction could be left to a jury when extrinsic evidence is re-
quired), and Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H, 945
F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that claim construction is based on
underlying facts determined by a jury), with SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding claim construction is a
matter of law with no factual issues), and SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that claim interpretation or construction
is solely a legal matter).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
6. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 968 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
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have trumpeted that juries and generalist judges are incapable of
rendering a correct, fair, and just verdict in a complex patent trial!
The decision greatly diminishes the jury's role in patent cases and
represents a drastic change to infringement trials. The jury is left
with a superfluous role8 because, after claim construction and the
resolution of any disputed terms, either the jury will be left with
only one reasonable result or the court will grant summary judg-
ment. Furthermore, Markman consolidates power within the
CAFC since claim construction will be reviewable by this appellate
court independently, without deference to the trial judge.9
Thus, under the guise of uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent, the Markman Court brushed aside factual questions that
may arise and ignored whether the Seventh Amendment substan-
tively requires participation by the jury.0 The Court seemed to
forget its own proclamation that "'[m]aintenance of the jury as a
fact finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a
place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtail-
ment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the ut-
most care."' '
This Note addresses the factors that influenced the Markman
Court to remove the jury from the claim construction process.
Markman is placed in the historical context of (1) the CAFC's ef-
fort to fulfill its congressional mandate to bring uniformity and
predictability to the patent system, 12 (2) the growing skepticism
7. See infra Part IV.B.1.
8. The jury will no longer participate in claim construction but will simply com-
pare the construed claims to the accused device to determine infringement. See infra
Part II.C. This Note focuses on direct, or literal, infringement and does not discuss
the jury's role under the doctrine of equivalents.
9. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 984 n.13.
10. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
11. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,486 (1935)).
12. See infra Part II.C. This explains the Supreme Court's acquiescence to the
CAFC's holding once no clear constitutional violation was determined. See Cardinal
Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 97 (1993) ("As a matter of practice, the
possibility that we would grant certiorari simply to review [the CAFC's] resolution of
an infringement issue is extremely remote, but as a matter of law we could do so...
."). However, this may be ill-advised given the assumption of some judges on the
CAFC who believe the Supreme Court will correct any of their errors. See Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Plager, J., dissenting) (noting that if the CAFC had erred in removing the jury from
determining the doctrine of equivalents, "the Supreme Court, sooner or later, will
correct us").
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concerning jury abilities,'3 and (3) the evolution of patent practice
from a mere description of the core invention to a method of dis-
tinctly claiming the outer scope of the invention.
14
Part II begins with a review of the development and polices of
the United States patent system. It presents a discussion of the
CAFC's history and principles along with background concerning
the issue of infringement and the Seventh Amendment. Part III
provides a summary of the Markman case, including the district
court, CAFC, and Supreme Court opinions. Part IV addresses the
fundamental issues involved in the case including the question of
fact and substance, uniformity in patent law application, and the
ramifications of Markman. Part V concludes that the decision
went too far in stealing claim construction from the jury's grasp.
The Supreme Court ignored current rules and procedures that
safeguard the constitutional right to a jury trial and provide uni-
formity, accuracy, and predictability to a jury's verdict.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Principles of the United States Patent System
1. Development of the United States patent system
The Constitution gives Congress the right "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 5 A patent is a grant by the federal
government to an inventor that gives the inventor the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the invention. An im-
portant point to note in the context of Markman is that the patent
application practice in the United States evolved from a mere
specification or description of the device to detailed "claims '1 7 de-
13. See infra Part IV.B.l.
14. See infra Part II.A.1. This is important because the determination of whether
the right to a jury trial exists for claim construction depends on the state of patent
law at the time of the Seventh Amendment ratification. See infra Part II.C.
15.1 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (simply stating that a patent is a grant of the
right to exclude others from using the technology defined in the patent's claims).
17. "Claims are the numbered paragraphs appearing at the end of the patent
specification which contain words used by the inventor to describe his or her inven-
tion." Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1842 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (citing In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
June 1997] 1709
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fining the novel aspect of the invention that makes it patentable. 8
In 1790 Congress inaugurated the United States patent system
by passing the Patent Act.' 9 The Act required inventors to file
with the Secretary of State20 a specification that described the thing
invented, distinguished the invention or discovery from other
things already invented, and enabled a workman to make or use it
so that the public would have the full benefit of the invention after
the patent expired.2'
The Patent Act of 1836n further required that the inventor
particularly specify what was claimed as the new invention or dis-
covery.23 The 1836 Act also established the Patent Office, which
assumed the powers and duties of the Secretary of State in refer-
ence to patents.24 For the first time a governmental body, rather
than a few individuals, examined patent applications to determine
their novelty and worthiness of receiving a patent2 The Patent
Office required the inventor to clearly explain and "point out the
part, improvement, or combination,... [claimed as the] invention
or discovery.2'
Due to the establishment of patent claims as the primary
measure of the patent's scope, the Patent Office inquiry and patent
attorney practice gradually shifted from a core description to the
1985)). For a more detailed historical development of patent claims, see Karl B.
Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
134 (1938); Homer J. Schneider, Claims To Fame, 71 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF.
Soc'Y 143 (1989); William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent
Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755 (1948).
18. See Lutz, supra note 17, at 135-43; Woodward, supra note 17, at 758-60.
19. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1-7, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-293).
20. The 1790 Act imposed upon the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and
Attorney General the duty of granting a patent to every inventor when two of the
above-mentioned office-holders deemed the discovery sufficiently useful and impor-
tant. See id. § 1, 1 Stat. 109-10 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 6).
21. See id. § 2, 1 Stat. 110 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112). "Enabling"
means that the specification must describe the manner of making and using the in-
vention in clear terms, to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use it. See 2
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.03[2] (1996).
22. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 1-21, 5 Stat. 117 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-293).
23. See id. § 6,5 Stat. at 119 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112).
24. See id. § 1, 5 Stat. at 117-18 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 1).
25. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
81 (Clark Boardman Co. & Sage Hill Pubs., Inc. 1971) (1890).
26. Patent Act of 1836, § 6, 5 Stat. at 119 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §
112).
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modem claim distinctly defining the invention's scope. This re-
sulted in patent applications that defined not only the core or es-
sence of the invention, but also defined the patent's outer bound-
ary in precise detail. A further revision of the 1836 Act formalized
claims by requiring the inventor to "particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim" the invention.2
The present statute,29 enacted in 1952, requires a specification
that contains "a written description of the invention" and
"conclude[s] with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention. ,'' Today the claims of a patent define the scope
of the exclusionary right created by the patent grant.31
2. Policies of the United States patent system
A patent is a bargain between the inventor and the govern-
ment in which the inventor obtains the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention in exchange for giving
up secrecy and fully disclosing the details of the invention to the
public.
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention;
second, it promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate
further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent re-
quirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.
27. See generally Lutz, supra note 17, at 135-43 (discussing the transition in
claiming methods).
28. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 112).
29. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
1-293).
30. Id. § 112, 66 Stat. at 798 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112); see also Orthokinetics,
Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining
that the disclosure portion of the specification describes the invention); Autogiro Co.
of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96, 398 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding that the
specification may define terms used in the claims, but the claims define the precise
scope of the patent).
31. The process results in a government grant of exclusivity with the patent's
claims defining the scope of the grant. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387-88 (1996). Patent claims are analogous to the description in a
deed that sets the property boundaries. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Unii'ersal
Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502,510 (1917).
32. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,262 (1979).
June 1997] 1711
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Patent law rewards invention by giving the patentee a grant
"for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and
ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States." 33 As Abraham Lincoln
noted, "[t]he patent system.., added the fuel of interest to the fire
of genius."
However, in order to receive this grant, the patent's claims
must provide notice of what the patent protects to those skilled in
the relevant art.35 This also allows others to construct and use the
invention after the patent expires.36
Finally, patent laws require that the Patent Office make af-
firmative findings that each claim in a patent application consti-
tutes an invention patentable under the statutory criteria and that
it is described with the requisite precision.37 As Thomas Jefferson
stated, from the outset, federal patent law has dealt with the diffi-
cult business "of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and
those which are not., 38 Thus, the patent system provides the in-
centive for invention of private monopolies while protecting
33. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). "The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to
the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an induce-
ment, to bring forth new knowledge." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9
(1966).
34. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 112, 121 (Richard N. Current ed.,
1967).
35. The patent must "'inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits
of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used
or manufactured without a license and which may not."' Schriber-Schroth Co. v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 214-15 (1940) (quoting Permutit Co. v. Graver
Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)).
36. See General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)
("[Patent limits] must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encourage-
ment of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the pat-
ent will be dedicated ultimately to the public."); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419,
424 (1891) (The object of patent law is "not only to secure to [inventors] all to which
[they are] entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them."). The
1790 Patent Act required filing of a specification so that the invention could be dis-
tinguished from the prior art and a skilled person could replicate it "to the end that
the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term."
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1994)).
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 ("The Commissioner shall cause an examination to be
made of the application and the alleged new invention .... ).
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in BASIC
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 708, 713 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944).
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against the indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges.
B. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Congress created the CAFC in 1982 by merging two existing
Article III courts-the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.39 The CAFC has exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion over patent issues and primary responsibility for interpreting
and developing patent rules and principles.4° Congress created the
CAFC to relieve the regional appeals courts' workload, achieve
greater uniformity in patent law development and application, and
provide more effective use of currently available federal judicial
resources. 4  The courts found patent cases to be complex and
time-consuming. 42 In addition, forum shopping occurred because
of the uneven application of patent law among federal circuits.43
Furthermore, Congress recognized that the Supreme Court's
broad jurisdiction and limited resources precluded it from review-
ing patent cases with the frequency necessary to perform its role.
44
Thus, Congress established the CAFC to provide a stable and
predictable development and application of patent law.45
39. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994), 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146); H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at
16-17 (1981). Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution grants Congress the authority
to establish inferior courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 8, 20. See generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 21, §
11.06[3][e][i] (reviewing the CAFC history, composition, and rules); Rochelle Coo-
per Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1989) (describing the CAFC's progress in establishing an accurate, precise,
and coherent body of law for patent cases); Robert Desmond, Comment, Nothing
Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Federal Circuit,
Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the Standard of Obviousness Under the
Patent Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 455 (1993) (discussing the development of the
CAFC and the CAFC's influence on patent law).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-24; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-7 (1981); 3
CHISUM, supra note 21, § 11.06[3][e][i].
42. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 17-24.
43. See id. The district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. See 28 U.S.C. §
1338.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22. Previously, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in only a small percentage of patent cases. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 21, §
11.06[3][e][i], at 11-361 n.176. With the creation of the CAFC, one of the primary
grounds for granting certiorari-a conflict among the federal circuits-is rarely pres-
ent since appellate review is concentrated in the CAFC. See id.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20; see also Joff Wild, The Battle for Clients in
the Golden State, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 1996, at 14, 16 (noting that the
CAFC's composition of a fixed number of permanent judges at one location has led
June 1997] 1713
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C. The Issue of Infringement and the Right to a Jury Trial
Infringement is the unauthorized invasion of the patent
owner's exclusive right as defined by the patent's claims.' The
patent owner may file a civil action for infringement against an in-
fringing party.4' Therefore, a person is liable for infringement
when that person without authority "makes, uses or sells any pat-
ented invention, within the United States."'
Determining infringement is a two-step process. The first
step, claim construction, is a determination of the meaning and
scope of the patent claims allegedly infringed.49 The second step is
a comparison of the properly construed claims to the allegedly in-
fringing device. ° Jury participation in either step is dependent
upon the application of the Seventh Amendment.s"
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[fin Suits at common
law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law."5"
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury if that
right existed under the English common law when the Amend-
ment was adopted in 1791. Therefore, if 1791 patent infringe-
ment suits were tried by a jury and factual disputes concerning the
scope of the invention were determined by a jury, then the Seventh
Amendment requires jury participation in the claim construction
process.
to a more coherent application of patent law across the United States).
46. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 21, § 8.01. As discussed supra Part II.A.1, the
claims define the invention.
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
48. Id. § 271(a).
49. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir.
1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,
821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
50. See id. (citing Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 821).
51. See infra Part III.C.1.
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
53. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
Suits at common law involve a determination of legal rights rather than recognition
and administration of equitable rights and remedies. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990). This includes "causes of action
created by Congress," id. at 565 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417
(1987)), including patent actions, see Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 200 (1881).
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III. MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC.
A. Background
Herbert Markman is the inventor and owner of United States
Reissue Patent No. 33,054 (the '054 patent) entitled, "Inventory
Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores.,1 4 The '054
patent is an inventory-control system that attempts to solve inven-
tory-related problems prevalent in the dry-cleaning industry." In a
traditional dry-cleaning process, articles of clothing are sorted and
then moved through different locations in the dry-cleaning estab-
lishment. 6 Two problems inherent in the process include lost
clothing, that results in customer dissatisfaction, and missing pa-
perwork, that results in lost profitsY
The invention of the '054 patent, as detailed in the patent
specification, monitors the progress of articles through the laundry
and dry-cleaning process. An attendant enters information about
the articles of clothing using a keyboard and data processor; a
printout of the stored information, along with article tags, is then
attached to the clothes. 9 Optical detector devices located at vari-
ous points in the cleaning process read the article tags and monitor
the articles throughout the cleaning process.6
Markman and his licensee, Positek, Inc., (Markman) sued
Westview Instruments, Inc. and Althon Enterprises, Inc.
(Westview) for infringement of the '054 patent.6' The Westview
device is similar to Markman's invention but permanently retains
in memory only the invoice number, date, and cash total.62 It in-
cludes a portable unit comprising a microprocessor and an optical
detector for reading bar-coded tickets or invoices, which can be
used to find any discrepancy between the particular invoice read
54. Markman, 52 F.3d at 971. This Note uses the CAFC's opinion for case back-
ground because it contains the most complete discussion of the relevant facts.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 972. The overall result is that additions to and deletions from in-
ventory can be located wherever an optical detector appears and can be associated
with particular customers and articles of clothing, thereby reconciling the inventory.
See id.
61. See id. at 967, 972. Althon owned and operated two dry-cleaning sites and
used Westview's device in one of its shops. See id. at 972.
62. See id. at 972.
June 1997] 1715
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and the list of invoices.6
B. The District Court's Decision
The case turned on the meaning of the word "inventory" in
the '054 patent.6M If inventory meant either "cash or invoices" or
"articles of clothing," then the '054 patent was infringed.6 How-
ever, if inventory necessarily included articles of clothing, then the
'054 patent was not infringed since Westview's device could not
track individual articles of clothing.66 The district court decided a
jury trial was appropriate for both components of the infringement
test.67 The court instructed the jury to compare the claims in the
'054 patent with the Westview device to determine if the Westview
device infringed on the patent.6 The jury found that Westview in-
fringed on two of the three claims.69 The court then heard argu-
ment on and granted Westview's deferred motion for judgment as
a matter of law, holding that claim construction was a matter of
law for the court.70 The court determined that inventory meant
articles of clothing7' and since Westview's system did not retain in-
formation regarding the particular articles of clothing, there was
72no infringement.
C. The Court of Appeals's Decision
Markman appealed to the CAFC, arguing that the meaning of
63. See id. at 973.
64. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536-38
(E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 973. The test for infringement includes determining
claim construction and comparison of the construed claims to the alleged infringing
device. See supra Part II.C.
68. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
69. See id.
70. See id. The trial court essentially allowed the jury to make the interpretation,
then reversed itself and determined the issue as a matter of law.
71. According to the court, the definitions given by Markman's expert witness
were contrary to the ordinary and customary meaning of these terms as well as the
obvious meaning intended by the patentee. See Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
The meaning of a claim's terms is determined from the specifications, drawings, and
file histories of the original patent and the patent-in-suit. See id.
72. See id. at 1537-38. "A finding of literal infringement requires that the ac-
cused device include every element of the claim as properly interpreted." Id. at 1537
(citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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a claim term is a factual question for the jury to determiner
Markman further argued that the trial court thwarted this right to
a jury determination of factual issues by mistakenly believing that
it had the authority to find the facts and reinterpret the claims as if
no jury or jury verdict existed.74 Westview focused on the patent
and prosecution history75 to determine the meaning of the word
"inventory" and argued that this determination was a legal matter
for the court.76
The CAFC's response included a majority opinion written by
Chief Judge Glenn Archer joined by seven circuit judges, concur-
ring opinions written by Circuit Judges Haldane Mayer and Ran-
dall Rader, and a dissenting opinion written by Circuit Judge Pau-
line Newman.77
1. The majority opinion
The CAFC noted that it had ruled inconsistently in the past on
whether claim construction is a legal or factual issue, or a mixture
of both.7' The court identified two lines of cases in its precedent:
one holding that claim construction is a matter of law and the sec-
ond holding that claim construction may have underlying factual71
inquiries that must be submitted to a jury. The CAFC, preferring
the first view, noted that the second view developed due to an er-
roneous interpretation of precedent. Thus, the CAFC held that
in a jury trial the trial court has the power and obligation to con-
73. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 974-75.
74. See id.
75. "The prosecution history is the record in the Patent and Trademark Office of
what transpired during examination of the patent application." Id. at 1003
(Newman, J., dissenting). Prosecution history consists of the documented accumula-
tion of the patent disclosure, drawings, claims of a patent application, filing of the
responses and amendments to the objections of the examiner, interviews with the
examiner, and timely payment of the appropriate fees. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 267 (1991).
76. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 974.
77. See id. at 970. The twelfth member, Circuit Judge William Bryson, did not
participate. See id. at 970 n.** (footnote unnumbered in original). Circuit Judge
Randall Rader thought that the particular claim construction did not present a ques-
tion of fact and therefore believed most of the majority's opinion was dicta. See id.
at 998 (Rader, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 976. The court noted that claim interpretation and claim construc-
tion, as used in contract law and which the dissent used as an analogy, means one
and the same thing. See id. at 976 n.6.
79. See id. at 976.
80. See id. at 977.
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strue as a matter of law the meaning of language used in a patent
claim, and the CAFC reviews claim construction de novo on ap-
peal.8'
The CAFC's rationale for construing patent claims as a matter
of law is that "[i]t has long been and continues to be a fundamental
principle of American law that 'the construction of a written evi-
dence is exclusively with the court."'' The CAFC reasoned that:
(1) A patent's scope and meaning is uniquely suited for determi-
nation entirely by a court as a matter of law;3 (2) Competitors
must be able to reasonably determine the scope of the patentee's
rights;' 4 and (3) The patentee benefits since treating the patented
invention as a factual matter determined by a jury "would at once
deprive the inventor of the opportunity to obtain apermanent and
universal definition of his rights under the patent."
The court reaffirmed the rule that claim construction is de-
termined from the claims, specification, and prosecution history.86
However, the court also allowed the use of extrinsic evidence, in-
cluding expert testimony during claim construction. 7 The court
cautioned that it will neither weigh extrinsic evidence nor make
factual evidentiary findings but will simply use the extrinsic evi-
dence to assist in its own construction of the written document.88
The remainder of the opinion briefly discussed the implica-
tions of the Seventh Amendment jury trial right and attempted to
analogize a patent to a statute, while refuting the dissenting and
concurring opinion that a patent is similar to a contract, will, or
81. See id. at 979. The court then proceeded to affirm the lower court's findings.
See id. at 981-83. De novo review means that the appellate court can review the case
as if it originated in that court and ignore the findings and judgment of the trial court
except as they may be helpful. See STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICrIONARY 130 (3d ed.
1991).
82. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180,
186 (1805)).
83. See id. The Court based this finding on the fact that a patent, by statute,
must provide a written description and distinctly claim what is considered to be the
invention. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 979 (quoting 2 ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 483-84).
86. See id. (quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
87. See id& at 979 (quoting Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 631
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
88. See id. at 981. According to the court, legal "experts" offering their conflict-
ing views do not create a question of fact. See id. at 983.
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deed. 9 The majority defended its holding against the charge that
the Markman decision deprives plaintiffs of the constitutional right
to a jury trial in patent infringement cases; stating that it was
merely "determining the scope of the [patent] claims" and that
"the application of the properly construed claim to the accused
device is preserved as it was in 1791." 9 Although charging all in-
volved9' with failing to cite any cases supporting the proposition
that claim construction involved triable issues of fact in or prior to
1791, the majority conceded that "[tihe search for such a case may
well be a fruitless one because of the manifest differences in patent
law in eighteenth century England and patent law as it exists today
in Title 35 of the United States Code."
2. Circuit Judge Mayer's concurring opinion
In a sharply worded concurrence,9 3 Judge Mayer suggested
that the majority's true aim was not just claim language, but rather,
to eject juries from infringement cases since "to decide what the
claims mean is nearly always to decide the case." 94 Judge Mayer
warned that "[t]he quest to free patent litigation from the
'unpredictability' of jury verdicts, and generalist judges, results
from insular dogmatism inspired by unwarrantable elitism; it is un-
constitutional.",F
Although agreeing that the ultimate issue of patent scope is a
question of law, Judge Mayer stated that the answer may depend
89. See id. at 984-87. If a patent is analogous to a contract, then like a contract
where claim construction is a question of law, underlying triable issues of fact may
exist. See id. at 984.
90. Id. at 984; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the evolution in the method
of defining an invention and noting that claims did not exist in 1791).
91. The participating parties were the concurring and dissenting judges and
amici.
92. Markman, 52 F.3d at 984.
93. "Today the court jettisons more than two hundred years of jurisprudence and
eviscerates the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States; it marks a sea change in the course of patent law that is
nothing short of bizarre." Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Mayer, J., concurring). This occurs either "when the judge affirmatively
takes the question from the jury by granting summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of law.... [or] when, even though the judge sends the question to the jury, his
interpretation of the claims forces the jury's decision on infringement." Id. at 993
(Mayer, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). "Declaiming that the jury is a 'black box'
incapable of a 'reasoned decision', several judges of the court have already advised
that they are aboard this campaign." Id. (citing In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 990
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Archer, C.J., Nies, J., Plager, J., dissenting)).
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on underlying factual inquiries. 6 When extrinsic evidence results
in a genuine dispute over the meaning of a term, it is the fact
finder's responsibility to settle it.97 If a question of claim construc-
tion is appealed, the CAFC reviews the ultimate construction of
the claims under the de novo standard applicable to all legal con-
clusions.9 Thus, for facts found during claim interpretation, the
CAFC's standard of review would be clear error for facts found b
a court and substantial evidence in support of a jury's verdict.
Otherwise, "the court today usurps a major part of the functions of
both trial judge and jury in patent cases, obliterating the tradi-
tional, defined differences between the roles of judge and jury, and
trial and appellate courts."'' 0
Warning that the decision also threatened to indirectly create
a "complexity exception"'' to the Seventh Amendment, Judge
Mayer cautioned that "there is simply no reason to believe that
judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the complex
technical issues often present in patent cases."' ° Furthermore, the
development of patent claims, although perhaps a major step in
the patent discipline, is irrelevant to the Seventh Amendment."'
3. Circuit Judge Newman's dissent
Judge Newman argued that patent infringement is a factual
question and that deciding the meaning of the patent's wording is
often dispositive of the question of infringement 1 4 Thus, the re-
sult of the majority's holding is that "[t]he jury is eliminated, and
96. See id. (Mayer, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
98. See id. (Mayer, J., concurring).
99. See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)) (Mayer, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 992 (Mayer, J., concurring).
101. A complexity exception would remove from a jury legally or factually com-
plex matters, for example, those appearing in some antitrust, securities, or patent
cases, because the matter is too complex for juries to comprehend and should there-
fore be tried by a single judge. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775
F.2d 1107, 1127 (Fed. Cir, 1985) (Markey, C.J., additional views).
102. Markman, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at
1128 & n.7 (Markey, C.J., additional views)). "[T]he effect of this case is to make of
the judicial process a charade, for notwithstanding any trial level activity, this court
will do pretty much what it wants under its de novo retrial." Id. (Mayer, J., concur-
ring).
103. See id, at 996 (Mayer, J., concurring). Claims were not expressly required
until the Patent Act of 1870. See supra Part II.A.1.
104. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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new and uncertain procedures are imposed on trial judges."1 5
Judge Newman's three principal concerns were: (1) In de-
termining the meaning and scope of the terms, the trier of fact
measures the weight, credibility, and probative value of conflicting
evidence;" 6 (2) The trial process is better suited for fact finding as
compared to the appellate level since the fact finder is present in
the courtroom when the evidence is being presented; 7 and (3) The
Seventh Amendment protects the right to a jury trial in patent
'0s
cases.
While agreeing that construction of documents is a matter of
law, Judge Newman argued that this does not deprive the underly-
ing facts of their factual nature. 09 Thus, the interpretation 0 of
disputed terms is a finding of fact and the legal conclusion is built
on a foundation of established facts."'
Judge Newman also cautioned appellate courts against the
temptation to redefine questions of fact as questions of law as a
vehicle for imposing the court's policy views. Without the defer-
ence previously given to trial courts by appellate courts, the effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and stability of the judicial system will be
lost."
3
105. Id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting). This results in "a dramatic realignment
of jury, judge, and the appellate process." Id. at 1024-25 (Newman, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting). Previously "the disputed meaning of
technologic terms and words of art ha[d] been treated by Federal Circuit precedent
as an 'underlying fact' on which the legal effect of the patent is based." Id.
(Newman, J., dissenting).
107. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Appellate briefs and fifteen minutes per
side of attorney argument are not designed for de novo findings of disputed techno-
logic questions.").
108. See id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting). "The majority today denies 200
years of jury trial of patent cases in the United States, preceded by over 150 years of
jury trial of patent cases in England, by simply calling a question of fact a question of
law." Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
110. Judge Newman noted that although a patent is not a contract, the distinc-
tion-interpretation versus construction-is recognized for many kinds of written
instruments. See id. at 1001 (Newman, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 1003 (Newman, J., dissenting). The facts discovered from disputed
terms in the patent specification were: (1) differences from the prior art; (2) deter-
mination of what occurred in the prosecution of the patent application; (3) findings
of technological fact; (4) and weighing the testimony of experts. See id. at 1003-08
(Newman, J., dissenting).
112. See id at 1008 (Newman, J., dissenting). "[I]t is an illusion to think that pat-
ent litigation difficulties can be resolved by turning factual issues into matters of law
and assigning them to the Federal Circuit." Id. at 1025 (Newman, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 1025-26 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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D. The Supreme Court's Decision
Justice David Souter delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court, which affirmed the CAFC's holding that construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court.'14  The Court applied a two-part
"historical test""' 5 and found unequivocally that infringement cases
must be tried before a jury, but that the old practice-concerning
infringement-provides no clear answer as to the precise role of
the jury."
6
The Supreme Court employed the historical test to show that
there was no clear reason to overrule the CAFC and then used
policy arguments of uniformity and predictability to support the
CAFC's holding that claim construction is a matter of law."'
Wisely, the Court avoided the statute-versus-contract debate that
the CAFC engaged in to justify its positions."' The Court also
noted that in over 200 years, the analogy of a patent to a statute
had never been used."9
The Court concluded that: (1) Judges are better than jurors in
the construction of written instruments since jurors are not trained
in exegesis;' 20 (2) Jurors' capabilities to evaluate demeanor, sense
the mainsprings of human conduct, and to reflect community stan-
dards are much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate
114. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
115. The test requires asking whether the cause of action was tried at law in 1791
or is at least analogous to one that was, and if so, whether the "particular trial deci-
sion must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right
as it existed in 1791." Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389; see also supra Part II.C
(explaining the Seventh Amendment's application).
116. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389.
117. See id. at 1393 ("Since evidence of common law practice at the time of the
Framing does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee to
the construction of the claim document, we must look elsewhere to characterize this
determination of meaning in order to allocate it as between court or jury.").
118. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 967, 984-87, 997-98,1001-02.
119. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26), available in 1996 WL 12585, at
*19. Comparing a patent to a statute helps justify the conclusion that hearing testi-
mony regarding the meaning of a term in a patent claim is a question of law, not fact.
Usually a patent has been compared to a contract. See, e.g., Lemelson v. General
Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202,1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("While there may be underlying fact
questions involved, the ultimate conclusion about the meaning and scope of a claim
is, like contract interpretation, a question of law.").
120. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395. Patent construction is a special occupation
requiring "special training and practice." Id.
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the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent;12'
and (3) The importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent means that juries should not participate in the claim con-
struction process.
IV. THE ISSUES OF FACT, SUBSTANCE, UNIFORMITY, AND SPECIAL
VERDIcTS-WHY MARKMAN WAS WRONG
A. Historical Test
The Supreme Court in Markman noted the utility of the dis-
tinctions between substance and procedure or issues of fact and
law.'2 The Court, however, instead relied on the historical test, 24
and determined that the history was unclear, claims nonexistent,
and the specification analogy ambiguous.' 5
The jury's role was unclear because patents and the role of the
judge and jury had evolved to the point where there was no longer
a precise correlation between past and present concerning claim
construction. As the Court noted, "absence of an established
practice should not surprise us," as claims did not achieve statutory
recognition until the passage of the 1836 Act and juries were still
new to the field at the end of the eighteenth century.'2 6 In fact,
patent law in England at that time was scarcely describable; from
1750 to 1799 there were only eighteen patent decisions in Eng-
land.' 27 In 1785 an attorney who was asked "[w]hat is the Law of
Patents?" reported that "the books are silent."'2I The Court found
121. See id. While admitting that credibility judgments will have to be made
about the experts who testify and that the court may have to choose between experts
whose testimony was equally consistent with a patent's internal logic, the Court felt it
is "doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases like that." Id.
122. See id. at 1396.
123. See id. at 1390.
124. See supra Parts II.C, III.D.
125. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389, 1390-91; see also supra Part II.A.1
(explaining that the American and English patents during the eighteenth century did
not contain claims by the inventor but simply required a written specification of the
invention).
126. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1390-91. "Prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a
claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that of the American
states." Lutz, supra note 17, at 134; see supra Part II.A.1 (discussing patent devel-
opment).
127. See H. I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1852, at 78 (1984).
128. John N. Adams & Gwen Averley, The Patent Specification: The Role of
Liardet v. Johnson, 7 J. LEGAL HIST. 156, 167 (1986).
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that patent law had an amorphous character and as late as the
1830s, "English commentators were irked by enduring confusion in
the field."9 Still, the question remains whether the jury would
have participated in the claim construction process under English
common law in 1791.
1. The question of fact and law
The CAFC judges agreed that claim construction is a matter
of law.130  They disagreed whether the existence of underlying
facts, especially in cases involving extrinsic evidence, require jury
participation. The Supreme Court dismissed the conflict by im-
plying that it would not occur often enough to be of any concern."
Thus, by holding that claim construction is a matter of law, the
Court eliminated the trial judge's ability to submit factual ques-
tions to the jury. As one court summarized:
[If] no underlying fact issue must be resolved, claim inter-
pretation is a question of law. Thus, a mere dispute over
the meaning of a term does not itself create an issue of
fact. This is true even where the meaning cannot be de-
termined without resort to the specification, the prosecu-
tion history or other extrinsic evidence provided upon
consideration of the entirety of such evidence the court
concludes that there is no genuine underlying issue of ma-
terial fact.133
However, if the judge is confronted with underlying factual dis-
putes where evidence is considered and weighed, credibility is as-
sessed, and demeanor is evaluated, then the judge should submit
the narrow fact question to the jury."4
A patent's meaning should be readily ascertainable from the
patent and its prosecution history. Ideally, the claim language is so
clear and unambiguous that there cannot be a dispute. However,
129. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1391.
130. See supra Part III.C.1-3.
131. See supra Part III.C.1-3.
132. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
133. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
134. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (stating that jury trials in
civil cases are designed "to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues");
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) (right to a jury on indi-
vidual factual issues cannot be lost simply because they are intertwined with legal or
equitable issues).
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"'[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged."" 3  Un-
doubtedly cases arise where the language of the specification,
claims, and prosecution history lack the required information to
solve a disputed issue."' Claims use words that are inherently
ambiguous; these words are written by people with an incomplete
understanding of the invention who attempt to distinguish the in-
vention from prior art bearing the same ambiguities. ' Therefore
courts accept and encourage the assistance of extrinsic evidence,
including the testimony of expert witnesses, in ascertaining the
true meaning of technical terms or terms of art within patent
claims.' 38 This does not render every question of technical inter-
pretation requiring admission of extrinsic evidence and expert tes-
timony a question of law. 39 The trial judge still must determine
whether a genuine factual question arises and whether extrinsic
evidence is required.
The lack of clear distinction between law and fact further
compounds the problem.' 4° One commentator noted that "[n]o
two terms of legal science have rendered better service than 'law'
and 'fact.' . . . They readily accommodate themselves to any
meaning we desire to give them .... What judge has not found
refuge in them?",'4' While claim construction is ultimately a ques-
tion of law, the Supreme Court in Markman held that "any credi-
bility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily so-
phisticated analysis of the whole document."' 42 The Court refused
135. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418,425 (1918)).
136. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 767 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (D.
Colo. 1991) (holding that construction of patent claim is a matter of law but underly-
ing factual disputes may arise pertaining to extrinsic evidence).
137. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. CI. 1967)
("Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face .... The very nature of
words would make a clear and unambiguous claim a rare occurrence.").
138. See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546 (1870).
139. See Order of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 525-28 (1947).
140. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). "[T]he appropriate method-
ology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the
least, elusive.... [T]he Court has yet to arrive at 'a [sic] rule or principle that will
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion."' Id. (quoting Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,288 (1982)).
141. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930).
142. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395. The Court was aware that by categorizing
claim construction as a question of law there would be "more expert testimony being
considered by the judge [in the patent area] than in any other [area known]."
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Markman v. Westview Instru-
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to acknowledge the logical consequence that admission of extrinsic
evidence often creates factual disputes.
The Court's view of extrinsic evidence in the claim construc-
tion process is both short-sighted and unrealistic.'43 The evidence
is obviously being presented by self-interested participants in the
adversary process. Therefore, certain evidence will have to be
credited over other evidence. Determining the weight and credi-
bility of witness testimony is a fundamental role of the jury.144 As
Judge Frank Easterbrook once commented, "'judges should not
pretend that all nominally 'legal' issues may be resolved without
reference to facts' and that '[w]hat seems clear to a judge may read
otherwise to [one skilled in the art]."'1 4 4
In Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Industries46 the court
found startling Markman's conclusion that "the [trial judge] does
not make credibility assessments or other factual findings based on
the extrinsic evidence."' 47 The court went on to add:
As I understand Markman, because claim construction
presents a purely legal question, trial judges must ignore
all non-transcribible [sic] courtroom occurrences such as a
witness's body language, inability to maintain eye contact
when confronted with a telling question, hesitance or de-
lay in giving an answer, an affirmative answer in a voice
revealing the truthful answer is "no," or the changing de-
meanor of a witness when shifting from sure to treacher-
ous footing. All of the preceding occurred in this trial.
When two experts testify differently as to the meaning of
a technical term, and the court embraces the view of one,
the other, or neither while construing a patent claim as a
matter of law, the court has engaged in weighing evidence
ments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26), available in 1996 WL 12585, at *34.
143. The Supreme Court felt that factual questions concerning extrinsic evidence
woufld be rare. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395. The CAFC also decided that since
patent applications are reviewed by patent examiners, "there should exist no factual
ambiguity when those same claims are later construed by a court of law in an in-
fringement action." Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
144. The fundamental importance of this role is demonstrated by the fact that the
right to a jury trial played a central role in the creation of the entire Bill of Rights.
See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 657 (1973).
145. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 849
(D, Del. 1995) (quoting In re Mahurkar, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation)).
146. 890 F. Supp. 329 (D. Del. 1995).
147. Id. at 333.
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and making credibility determinations. If those possessed
of a higher commission wish to rely on a cold written rec-
ord and engage in de novo review of all claim construc-
tions, that is their privilege. But when the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do
something that the trial court does and must do to per-
form the judicial function, that court knowingly enters a
land of sophistry and fiction.'4
The court further added that "bound by slavish adherence to the
fiction that a judge does not make credibility determinations when
confronted with testimonial extrinsic evidence," the opinion omits
credibility assessments that the judge unavoidably made. 49
The Supreme Court and CAFC allowance of extrinsic evi-
dence constitutes an admission that ambiguity may arise regarding
the meaning of a patent claim that the prosecution history and
claim specification may not clarify. Extrinsic evidence may re-
quire credibility determinations that raise factual questions. Al-
lowing the trial judge to determine when this occurs and then
submitting the narrow fact question to the jury is consistent with
the Seventh Amendment's requirement "that questions of fact in
common law actions shall be settled by a jury."'5
2. Question of substance and procedure
The Seventh Amendment protects the essence of the right to a
jury trial rather than providing procedural safeguards.51  As the
Court has repeatedly said, whether jury involvement is required
"must depend on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibil-
ity [of issue determination] as necessary to preserve the 'substance
148. Id. at 333 n.7; see also Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850 (noting that there ap-
peared to be a genuine dispute concerning a material fact over the proper interpre-
tation of words in the patent and that this issue would normally have been submitted
to the jury).
149. Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 333-34 n.7; see also Pall Corp. v. Micron
Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring)
("[T]here is little for the uninitiated to choose between the contending interpreta-
tions. As far as I can see, this court's action is based on mere preference, thus illus-
trating the artificiality of Markman.").
150. See Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593,596 (1897).
151. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). In
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that
there have been many procedural devices developed since 1791 that diminish the
civil jury's historic domain; these have been adjudged consistent with the Seventh
Amendment. See id. at 336.
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of the common-law right of trial by jury.' 12 It is undisputed that
infringement cases require a jury trial.'53 Given, however, that
claim construction is solely a question of law, the Court failed to
ask if any substantial or meaningful decisions remained for jury
determination. 54
If the CAFC concurring and dissenting opinions are correct-
that determining claim construction resolves the case-' 55then
eliminating the jury from this process violates the spirit of the
Constitution. This interpretation relegates juries to the role of
"rubber stamps" and allows only one "reasonable result."' 56 As
one court noted, "Markman makes clear that the proper construc-
tion of a claim can make short work of the question of infringe-
ment."'
Parties rarely agree about the meaning of claim terms. 58 They
offer opposing interpretations of how the challenged invention
compares to the words in the patent claim.' This process is cen-
tral to many patent cases. Thus, resolving the claim's meaning also
resolves the infringement issue, leaving nothing for the jury to de-
termine.'60
Originally, the inventor attempted to describe and define the
invention through the specification.61 Despite evidence that courts
152. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1390 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426
(1987)).
153. See supra Part III.D.
154. The Supreme Court was clearly concerned with subverting the role of the
jury. During oral arguments a major concern was the possibility of "tak[ing] the is-
sues one by one and tak[ing] them away from the jury, and pretty soon you'll have
nothing triable to a jury." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Mark-
man v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26), available in
1996 WL 12585, at *45.
155. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 989, 999.
156. Id. at 989.
157. General Mills v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Minn. 1996).
158. See ElfAtochem, 894 F. Supp. at 858.
159. See id. at 858-59; see also Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64
F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996) ("[I]t is likely
that the adversaries will offer claim interpretations arguably consistent with the
claims, the specification and the prosecution history that produce victory for their
side.").
160. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76, 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (meaning of claim terms is the central issue of patent litigation); Elf
Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 859 (determining that this particular case will be resolved
once claim construction is determined).
161. See supra Part II.A.1.
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interpreted the meaning of the specification to some extent,162 the
general and imprecise language usually prevented the court from
pursuing the infringement inquiry to completion. The fact finder
received the still-imprecise language, which simply described the
core or heart of the invention, and used it to determine if in-
fringement existed.16 ' Accordingly, in 1791 a jury in England
sorted through a patent granted without examination64 to deter-
mine what the invention was, compared it to inventions known,
and then determined whether the accused device was similar
enough to what was found to be the invention. 65 Although this de-
termination may not be analogous to today's claims, and the na-
ture of the determination is arguably different,6 6 it is likely that ju-
rors engaged in fact finding. The jury, even after the court's
interpretation, still had to refine the specification construction and
determine any unanswered factual questions. The jurors then
needed to assess whether infringement occurred by determining
whether the accused device was the same as the subject matter
found in the patent.
For example, in the infringement case of Bramah v. Hardcas-
tle,'67 the judge summarized the evidence and suggested to the jury
that the patent was void and the invention was not new.' How-
ever, the jury ruled otherwise, sustained the patent, and found in-
fringement. 16  The court entered the jury's verdict as the judg-
ment. This illustrates that the jury played a larger role in the
judicial process than the superfluous one delegated by Markman's
result.
Clearly, the jury played a more meaningful role in patent
cases in the eighteenth century than what Markman allows today.
Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment was not based on the belief
162. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1392.
163. See supra Part II.A.1.
164. Examination of patent applications prior to approval did not commence until
1836. See supra Part II.A.1.
165. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1014-15 (Newman, J., dissenting).
166. See 3 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAw PERSPECTIVES § 7.6[2.-2] (1996).
167. 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (K.B. 1789), reprinted in I DECISIONS ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 51,53 (Benjamin V. Abbott ed., 1887).
168. See id., reprinted in I DECISIONS ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
51, 52-53 (Benjamin V. Abbott ed., 1887).
169. See id., reprinted in I DECISIONS ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
51, 53 (Benjamin V. Abbott ed., 1887).
170. See id., reprinted in I DECISIONS ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS
51,53 (Benjamin V. Abbott ed., 1887).
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that the use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial admini-
stration. Instead, a jury trial is a historical right and acts as a check
on the federal judiciary's power. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted
in Democracy in America:
It would be a very narrow view to look upon the jury as a
mere judicial institution; for however great its influence
may be upon the decisions of the courts, it is still greater
on the destinies of society at large. The jury is, above all,
a political institution, and it must be regarded in this light
in order to be duly appreciated."'
B. Uniformity and Predictability
Patent claims fix the boundary between proprietary rights and
the public domain, thus requiring proper, consistent, and predict-
able claim construction.172 Patent owner's rights become clouded
when courts do not reliably determine these boundaries. Ambigu-
ous claim drafting deters research and competition, creates uncer-
tainty as to rights, and encourages frivolous lawsuits."' Congress
emphasized the need for increased uniformity in patent law as a
major reason for establishing the CAFC and giving it exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction over patent matters. 1 This need for
"uniformity and definiteness" also motivated Congress to revise
the patent laws in 1952.'75
The Markman Court concluded that judges are better suited
to discern the acquired meaning of patent terms.' The underlying
171. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley
ed., 1985).
172. "The developed and improved condition of the patent law, and of the prin-
ciples which govern the exclusive rights conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambigu-
ous language or vague descriptions." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876). A
patent claim is not a "nose of wax" that can be twisted as the patent owner may de-
sire. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,51 (1886).
173. "[T]he uniformity in the law that will result from the centralization of patent
appeals in a single court will be a significant improvement from the standpoint of the
industries and businesses that rely on the patent system." H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at
23 (1981); see also Wild, supra note 45, at 18 (noting a patent is one of the most sig-
nificant assets a company owns in terms of the advantages it gives for licensing, mar-
ket control, and damages for infringement).
174. See supra Part II.B.
175. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
176. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996).
"[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than an-
other to decide the issue in question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
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rationale is that deciding claim construction and the factual issues
arising upon examination of extrinsic evidence requires training
and expertise and thus, the judge is more likely to give the proper
interpretation and make the correct decision.IV Furthermore,
claim construction as a matter of law promotes specific and clear
claims and consistent interpretation. However, although further-
ing uniformity in the interpretation of patents is a worthy goal, it
does not necessarily follow that judges are more competent to de-
cide the narrow factual questions that arise based on extrinsic evi-
dence.
1. View of the jury as inferior
An underlying premise in Markman is that issues involving
specialized areas of the law, such as patent law, are too compli-
cated for a jury, and therefore should only be decided by a judge.
179
This reflects a growing skepticism of a jury's ability to render cor-
rect verdicts in complex patent trials. For example, one report on
patent law reform stated "[i]n many cases, the litigation process
becomes at best a rough form of dispensing justice, and at worst, a
process which is no better than a gamble."'80 An American Bar
Association study on jury comprehension found that jurors had
difficulty understanding judicial instructions.' The study also
found that the jurors' familiarity with the issues of the case af-
fected comprehension and the ability to deal with large quantities
of evidence.'2
177. See supra Part III.D.
178. See supra Part III.D.
179. See supra Part III.C.1-D.
180. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM: A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 107 (1992) [hereinafter ADVISORY REPORT]; see also SIR
PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 98-99 (1966) ("Where there is need for uniformity
a jury is no use."); Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White Knight' Draws Cries of 'Patent
Blackmail,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990, § 3, at 5 (A jury trial for a patent case is "a
'judicial lottery,' an often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those
who are sufficiently aggressive.").
181. See Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 43-52
[hereinafter ABA Study]. But see John E. Kidd, Jury Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in
2 PATENT LITIGATION 1991, at 137, 156-58 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1991) (noting that the study
has been criticized because its results were based on a small sampling and that find-
ings from other surveys suggest that different conclusions may be warranted).
182. See ABA Study, supra note 181, at 25-26; see also Lemelson v. General Mills,
Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing jury verdict because the jury had
reached inherently inconsistent conclusions).
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Another problem is that a typical jury has little or no experi-
ence in the technical issues presented in most patent cases.' Fur-
thermore, the jury selection process, in which a party may chal-
lenge jurors who are perceived to possess education or experience
in the applicable technology, compounds this problem.' 84 One re-
view of the jury selection process found that more than half of the
jurors were excused for cause; those with relevant skills were more
likely to be excused, and those who had education beyond high
school were almost three times as likely to be challenged. 5 Often,
the party who believes its case to be factually weak will use its per-
emptory challenges to remove any juror potentially having an in-
formed understanding of the technical issues.'86 As former Chief
Justice Warren Burger said, "[e]xperienced business and profes-
sional people, accountants, professors of economics, statisticians or
others competent to cope with complex economic or scientific
questions" are often removed during the jury selection process or
excused from service by the court."
The increasing skepticism about the use of juries in complex
patent trials is accompanied by a dramatic rise not only in the
number of patent cases but also in the use of juries. In 1992 there
were 1474 patent cases filed, a twenty six percent increase over the
1171 cases filed in 1991.' From 1968 through 1970, only thirteen
patent cases out of 382-about three percent-were jury trials.8 9
By 1994 the figure had increased to seventy percent. 9° This
183. See, e.g., ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 180, at 107 (comprehending patent
trial principles is very demanding on the fact finder). Frequently, jury members are
unable to comprehend the technical and legal principles involved or absorb the often
voluminous evidentiary showing. See id. at 108.
184. See id. at 107.
185. See Douglas W. Ell, Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted
Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 778-82
(1978); see also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that only one out of 11 jurors had even limited technical education in a technically
complex case).
186. See Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979, 1004 n.100 (1987).
187. Laura A. Kiernan, Burger Sees Complex Trials Beyond Capacity of Jurors,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1979, at A4.
188. See DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1993
ANNUAL REPORT app. I, tbl. C-2A, at AI-59 (1993).
189. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,336
n.30 (1971).
190. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissent-
ing).
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prompted the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform to
comment that, "[i]f the trend toward use of juries in patent cases
continues, many Commission members believe that a serious
threat to the patent system itself could be developing.' 9'
Overall, a great deal is expected of juries, and it is not surpris-
ing that many commentators believe juries are simply not up to the
task.'92 How can a group of largely untrained people unite for a
brief period of time, listen to adverse parties argue complex theo-
ries, technical terms, and an explanation of legal terms and appli-
cable law, and then determine the correct result? This view, how-
ever, serves only as an apology for those who have determined that
only they, not the ignoramuses in the jury, could understand the
competing interpretations in a patent case and render a correct
decision. The notion that a single judge is capable of understand-
ing that which would confuse and mislead the combined wisdom of
twelve lay jurors is paternalistic and should be rejected.
Numerous studies support the premise that the jury can per-
form its fact finding role even when confronted with complex sci-
entific evidence.' 93 In addition, those attempting to reverse the his-
torical and constitutional presumption of jury competence often
ignore the fact that we should assess the jury's ability only in com-
parison to the judge's ability. Howard Markey, former Chief Jus-
tice of the Federal Circuit, noted that there is no empirical evi-
dence to demonstrate that "each of more than 500 trial judges can
191. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 180, at 109. One possible reason for the in-
creased use of juries is that many juries "have proven eager to side with inventors
against large companies." Andrews, supra note 180, at 5; see also Daniel Akst, Pat-
ent Suit Jury Trials are the Rage, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1994, at D10 (noting that ju-
rors tend to favor independent inventors and small companies and the verdicts are
more likely to be upheld on appeal); Wild, supra note 45, at 18 (stating that there has
been an increase in the number of jury trials and damages awarded with the jury
viewed as more sympathetic to the plaintiff).
192. See, e.g., Franklin Strier, The Road to Reform: Judges on Juries and Attor-
neys, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1249 (1997) (discussing various trial reform proposals and
assessing the degree of judicial popularity of each).
193. See generally Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the De-
bate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scien-
tific "Objectivity," 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1094-98 (1993) (finding that the notion of
juror incompetence not only lacks empirical support but runs directly counter to
mounting evidence that jurors are capable of deciding complex questions); Kenneth
R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the Compre-
hensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence,
32 ARiz. L. REV. 915, 930-35 (1990) (discussing juror studies that give the jury high
marks for comprehension, recall, and evaluation of expert evidence, and application
of the evidence and the law).
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be guaranteed to reach more 'correct' judgments than those en-
tered on jury verdicts."194 This observation is bolstered by an
American Bar Association juror comprehension study, which
concluded that juries in complex and technological cases often
reached verdicts consistent with the trial judge's opinion of the
evidence.' 95 Further, while a jury's attention is focused on one
trial, a judge may be distracted by other trials on the docket and
lack the broad experience and collective decision-making skill of
the jury. Also, federal district judges have relatively little experi-
ence with patent cases.' Thus, the judge typically has no better,
or perhaps less, insight than twelve jurors. Moreover, allocating all
issues of construction to the court will not guarantee the uniform-
ity desired by Congress because district court judges remain free to
disagree with one another as do different panels of the federal cir-
cuit.197
Appellate judges also lack technical expertise in the scientific
disciplines. Markman relies on an unrealistic premise that the
CAFC has both the ability to engage in de novo review in every
patent case and the expertise to identify the correct interpreta-
tion. 9a Subjecting the trial court's factual findings to de novo re-
view ignores the inherent limitations of appellate courts and also
undermines the accurate and predictable adjudication of infringe-
ment actions. As Judge Mayer observed:
194. Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 372 (1987);
see also Kiernan, supra note 187, at A4 ("'there is a limit to the capacity of any of
us-jurors or even a judge-to understand and remember complicated transactions
described in a long trial"'(quoting former Chief Justice Warren Burger)).
195. See ABA Study, supra note 181, at 12, 16.
196. See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284
(2d Cir. 1974) ("This patent appeal is another illustration of the absurdity of requir-
ing the decision of such cases to be made by judges whose knowledge of the relevant
technology derives primarily, or even solely, from explanations by counsel and who
... do not have access to a scientifically knowledgeable staff." (footnote omitted));
Jerome G. Lee, Tactical Considerations in Jury and Bench Trials of Patent Cases, in
PATENT LITIGATION 1986, at 107, 110 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 233, 1986) (noting that patent cases
are a small part of a typical judge's case load and that there is a turnover in district
judges).
197. See generally Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396 (noting that issue preclusion will
not apply between federal district courts on the question of claim construction, but
the CAFC will bind all district courts through stare decisis); Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. University of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (noting that nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel applies).
198. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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To suggest that appellate judges, precious few of whom
are trained in science, will always arrive at the "true"
meaning of words embodying complex concepts endows
them with knowledge and enlightenment far beyond
those who have training and experience in-the field. They
are in no position to declare the state of knowledge in the
art or that scientific hypotheses are correct as a matter of
law.19
The courts do not create uniformity even when the judge de-
termines the claim construction issue.2 ° Letting the jury decide
the ultimate infringement issue-if there is something left for the
jury to decide after claim construction-defeats the attempt at uni-
formity. Different interpretations by different juries in different
infringement actions could reach inconsistent results that would
not be subject to de novo review.
Overall, the view of the jury as an inferior fact finder is unsub-
stantiated. Furthermore, there is a constitutional right to a jury
trial and a court should not diminish this right in patent cases just
because the court believes itself better suited to find technological
facts. As Judge Mayer noted in Markman, there is no "complexity
exception" in the Seventh Amendment.20
2. The unique view of one skilled in the art
The Supreme Court and the CAFC were motivated by a de-
sire to liberate patent litigation from the apparent
'unpredictability' of jury verdicts. However, disputes about scien-
tific evidence, expert testimony, and technological issues are
hardly unique to patent cases.20 Patent cases are unique in that
patent drafters address their descriptions to one skilled in the art
rather than to the legal community. 3 Claim interpretation re-
199. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Mayer, J., concurring).
200. Although, if a judge decides claim construction, the issue is settled nation-
wide, while if a jury decides, the decision is reviewed under the reasonable determi-
nation standard. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26), available in 1996 WL
12585, at *33. At least some of the justices were weighing this nationwide uniformity
argument heavily since during oral arguments a justice noted it as a significant factor.
See id.
201. Markman, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 1004 (Newman, J., dissenting).
203. See Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 815 (1869) ("[T]hese de-
scriptions and terms of art often require peculiar knowledge and education to under-
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quires an objective inquiry into how one of ordinary skill in the
relevant art at the time of the invention would comprehend the
disputed word or phrase in view of the patent claims, specification,
and prosecution history.2 4 A judge is not the hypothetical person
skilled in the art to whom a patent is addressed . Determination
of the meaning of a claim term requires analysis of complex sci-
ence and an appreciation of the technical terminology used in the
discipline. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be necessary to inform
the court about the disputed term and supply a perspective with
which to view the language in the patent. When the court weighs
extrinsic evidence to determine which competing view is correct, a
factual question often arises.
As Judge Learned Hand noted, "[tihe question.., of how the
art understood the term, . . . was plainly a question of fact.
' 206
Thus, extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning of a word in a
claim potentially raises a significant factual question and thus falls
under the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for claim con-
struction.
3. Use of the general verdict
If jury decisions concerning the meaning of a patent claim
make the patent system unpredictable, the use of the general ver-
dict2  only amplifies the problem. General verdicts, which are
commonly used, ask juries to decide whether the accused device
stand them aright; and slight verbal variations, scarcely noticeable to a common
reader, would be detected by an expert in the art, as indicating an important varia-
tion in the invention."); see also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 858 (D. Del. 1995) ("[P]atent laws focus the requirements of
the information that must appear in each patent and its claims on those skilled in the
art.").
204. See Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1224.
205. See id.; Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996) (noting that the judge did not possess
requisite technical background to interpret the obscure scientific terms and "candidly
express[ed] considerable difficulty in understanding the chemistry and law involved
in the case"); Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 62 F.3d 1388, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the jury had applied the correct patent claim construction but the
district court had adopted an erroneous construction); Victoria Slind-Flor, Tackling
High Tech: Jurists Learn to Cope with the Brave New World, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 19,
1992, at 1 (finding judges are intimidated by and have difficulty comprehending
complex science and technology issues).
206. Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1224 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Harries v. Air King
Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 1950)).
207. A general verdict is an ordinary verdict that simply declares which party pre-
vails, without any special findings of fact. See GIFIS, supra note 81, at 518.
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comes within any of the claims of the plaintiff's patent."' For ex-
ample, in Markman the trial judge instructed the jury to determine
infringement by "determin[ing] the meaning of the claims.' '2 9 This
procedure is flawed; the judge should not just shove the claim lan-
guage, prosecution history, specifications, and extrinsic evidence at
the jury with instructions to figure it all out.
The issue in Markman was neither complex, scientific, nor
technical. The question was whether the term "inventory" neces-
sarily included articles of clothing.210 The judge decided the issue
by considering the patent and its prosecution history.21 However,
if the issue does involve weighing extrinsic evidence, then formu-
lating the jury instruction on this narrow factual question will
eliminate the confusion and complexity of patent law. The jury
verdict will also be clear, resulting in an explicit claim construction
rather than the implicit construction of the general verdict. Thus,
the process will be clarified and improved by a court's awareness
of the complex legal and technical issues facing jurors and also of
the information appellate courts require from them in order to re-
view their verdicts.
C. Result of Holding
Because claim construction is a matter of law, a judge can de-
termine the issue as early as is reasonably practical during the
course of a civil infringement action.212 For example, the judge can
review claim construction at a pretrial scheduling conference, in a
motion for partial summary judgment, in a final pretrial order, in a
motion for a directed verdict, through the preparation of jury in-
structions, or even after a jury verdict in a motion for judgment as
a matter of law.21 Thus, parties will now routinely move for the
early resolution of the claim construction issue through summary
judgment or dismissal for failure to state a claim.2 4 Previously, if a
208. See, e.g., 1 DUANE BURTON, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CASES 20-5-1 to 20-54 (1996) (listing general verdict jury instructions for
the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits).
209. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. This is possible because the jury no longer participates in the claim construc-
tion process.
213. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50, 51, 56 (rules for judgment as a matter of law in actions
tried by jury, jury instructions, and summary judgment, respectively).
214. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,
857 (D. Del. 1995).
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court followed the line of CAFC decisions that held claim con-
struction may contain questions of fact, then a trial was required to
determine claim construction.
Settlements will become common because once the court de-
termines the meaning of the disputed term, there will often be lit-
tle left to litigate. Alternatively, after the court completes claim
construction, the parties will have an incentive to seek an inter-
locutory appeal to avoid a possible second trial if the CAFC re-
verses the trial court's claim construction on appeal.215
Markman affects patent trial procedure in many ways. By se-
lecting between two interpretations at issue or creating its own in-
terpretation, the court may leave the jury with only one possible
answer when determining the issue of infringement. Markman
also created the so-called "Markman trial," a pretrial hearing that
courts use to hear the extrinsic evidence necessary to determine
claim construction. 6 Markman trials increase the disjointedness
of a trial process already divided into many separate phases.2 7
Critics have pointed out that this process causes delays and forces
the jury to wait while the court determines claim construction.
2'8
As one judge warned "[t]wenty-one years of trial experience con-
vinces me that any jury hiatus should be avoided if at all possi-
ble.,
219
Furthermore, the judge must have immediate access to a trial
transcript and rapid briefing by the parties in order to determine
claim construction before giving the case to the jury.2 0 The court
215. See id. at 857-58 (noting the unusual procedure the district court would con-
sistently have to face in patent cases). Interlocutory decisions confer jurisdiction on
the appellate court-CAFC for issues concerning patents-to review a district
judge's ruling on a question of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
216. Markman hearings are proceedings conducted in patent cases in which the
trial judges hear detailed arguments and extrinsic evidence, review the patent and
the prosecution history, and resolve disputes of claim interpretation. See Elf Ato-
chem, 894 F. Supp. at 850; Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1839, 1842 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
217. See Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (noting that under Rule 42(b) a district court has broad discretion in separat-
ing issues and claims for trial as part of its wide discretion in trial management).
218. One judge noted in frustration that the "obligation" created by Markman
leaves a district court with three options: The court can (1) attempt to resolve the
disputes on the paper record; (2) hold a trial to resolve the disputes; or (3) wait until
trial and attempt to resolve claim disputes the evening before it instructs the jury.
See ElfAtochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850.
219. Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del.
1995).
220. See id.
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in Lucas Aerospace estimated that, after eleven days and 2900
pages of trial transcript consisting mostly of competing expert ex-
planations of claim constructions, it "probably would have taken
no less than five days for the parties to file helpful briefs and the
court to memorialize its holdings on claim construction in a
meaningful manner."2''  The court noted that "[i]f the jury were
sent home during this period, there is a very real chance that many
of the facts important to resolving the infringement issues will
have been forgotten.",
2
If a court holds a Markman trial, the patent case will encom-
pass two separate trials, with witnesses testifying once before the
court and then again before the jury.m This will increase the bur-
den on the district courts, increase the cost of litigation, and create
opportunities for impeachment by prior testimony. If a court does
not hold a Markman trial and hears all of the evidence in the pres-
ence of the jury, the claim construction given to the jury will
prejudicially impact the party whose construction the court re-
jected. The court will appear biased toward one party's expert
testimony at the expense of opposing counsel.
Markman's holding also disrupts the appellate process. The
appellate court will conduct a de novo review of the trial court's
judgment.224 This could be beneficial since early claim construction
in a complex patent suit fosters settlement, streamlines trials, and
promotes efficient use of judicial resources. Cases resolved with-
out jury trials may be a virtue, even in those rare instances when a
genuine evidentiary dispute exists regarding the technical meaning
of a claim term.2
However, the Seventh Amendment was not designed to pro-
mote judicial efficiency; it was designed as a check on the power of
221. Id.
222. Id. The court added that to take less time with claim construction would not
be "fair to the litigants when claim construction more often than not determines the
outcome on infringement." Id.
223. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76, 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that since most aspects of trial hinge on claim construction,
which after Markman is strictly a question of law, a conscientious court will generally
endeavor to make this ruling before trial).
224. The CAFC will review de novo what previously was considered a question of
fact, found by a jury, and reviewed on appeal using the clearly erroneous standard.
225. Cf Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996)
(noting that claim construction will be a matter of law even for cases that have a
genuine factual dispute).
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the judiciary.226 Thomas Jefferson described it as "the only anchor
ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to
the principles of its constitution." 7 The Founding Fathers feared
that elimination of the jury would impermissibly shift power to the
appellate courts.22 By calling a question of fact a question of law,
the Supreme Court subverts the Seventh Amendment. Specifi-
cally, the rule subverts the Reexamination Clause, which limits the
extent of appellate review on those issues of fact tried by a jury.229
The Supreme Court's analysis establishes a precedent that could
extend to areas outside patent claim interpretation-to areas that
are not crystal clear and yet involve the fundamental distinction
between law and fact and the jury's role as advanced by the Sev-
enth Amendment. °
A jury should resolve genuine, disputed issues and the jury's
findings considered on appeal under a clearly erroneous or simi-
larly deferential standard of review.23 The Markman holding al-
lows appellate judges to second-guess determinations made at the
trial level that were based on an evaluation of conflicting testi-
mony and to consider other extrinsic evidence previously subject
to deferential review. Thus, parties will view the appeal as a fresh
start and relitigate all claim construction issues, rendering the trial
a mere preview on the way to the main event. Additionally, by
allowing the appellate court to review de novo the issue of claim
construction, the appellate court may adopt an interpretation that
neither party anticipated.
For example, in Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol
Corp. 232 after a jury verdict for Exxon, the CAFC determined that
226. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1015 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
227. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in MARTIN
A. LARSON, JEFFERSON: MAGNIFICENT POPULIST 134 (1981).
228. See J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L.
REv. 483, 499 (1985) (explaining that this can be seen in the congressional debate
over the Judiciary Act of 1789).
229. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. A court must uphold a jury's factual findings
unless substantial evidence does not exist to support the findings. See Markman, 52
F.3d at 975.
230. See Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1042, 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (analogizing to the Markman holding, the court extended the appli-
cation to the copyright infringement test).
231. If the court is determining questions of fact, the standard of review is the
clearly erroneous standard. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
232. 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 30:1707
THE MARKMAN COURT
Exxon's claim interpretation was incorrect.23 The majority added
that when the trial court misinterprets the patent claim, the CAFC
independently construes the claim to determine its correct mean-
ing and then determines if facts presented at trial support the ap-
pealed judgment; if not, the CAFC reverses the judgment below
without remand for a second trial on the correct law. The dissent
pointed out that "[b]y advocating a different interpretation of the
claim sua sponte, the majority required Exxon to litigate during
trial not only its opponent's position but also the unknowable po-
sition of the appellate court."'23 Thus, the parties are forced to
present additional theories and increase the amount of evidence
presented at trial.236
Furthermore, subjecting the trial court's claim construction to
de novo review ignores the inherent limitations of appellate courts.
The review of a cold record concerning extrinsic evidence will not
give a clear answer for closely disputed, genuine issues of fact. It is
the fact finder's duty to draw inferences from and make findings
based on extrinsic trial evidence. 237 The trial court is the better fo-
rum to determine factual questions, and review should be per-
formed under a clearly erroneous standard. Otherwise, the proc-
ess skews the roles of the judge, jury, and appellate court. 3'
Finally, Markman ultimately subverts the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial and relegates the jury to a secondary role.
After the district court judge determines the disputed meaning of a
claim and the construction or scope of the patent's claims, there
will be little, if anything, left for the jury to decide. 239 The dispute
233. See id. at 1558. "No matter when or how a judge performs the Markman
task, on appeal we review the issue of claim interpretation independently without
deference to the trial judge." Id. at 1556.
234. See itL at 1560.
235. Id. at 1569 (Nies, J., dissenting). -
236. Alternatively, in spite of a trial judge's ruling on the meaning of disputed
words in a claim, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit may disagree and re-
mand the entire case for retrial on different claims. See Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at
857.
237. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 990 (Mayer, J., concurring).
238. See id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 990 (Mayer, J., concur-
ring) ("The court's revisionist reading of precedent to loose claim interpretation
from its factual foundations will have profoundly negative consequences for the well-
established roles of trial judges, juries, and our court in patent cases."); Lucas Aero-
space, 890 F. Supp. at 333 n.7 (stating that the court had to pretend not to make
credibility determinations and find facts).
239. By analogy, the patent's boundaries are drawn-much like surveying real
property; thus, determining whether the accused device infringes or a neighbor's
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will be settled when the boundaries are drawn by the judge.
D. Alternatives
1. Current conventional rules
The Supreme Court's holding that claim construction is a mat-
ter of law was based on the assumption that the judge, rather than
the jury, will give a more predictable and accurate decision and
will promote uniformity among the district courts.24 The holding
removed the determination from the trial judge as to when a ques-
tion of fact arises and ignored potential modifications to the jury
system that would greatly increase the ability of the jury to make
the correct determination and allow accurate appellate review.
Currently, the trial courts already have mechanisms for deal-
ing with groundless, irrational jury determinations. For example, a
court can direct a judgment as a matter of law in actions tried by
jury or summary judgment.24' Moreover, if a judge determines that
there is no genuine issue of fact concerning claim construction, a
judge may rule on claim construction as a matter of law. 4 If a
judge requests further information simply to construe the meaning
of words, this does not automatically create a genuine dispute; nor
does evidence that conflicts with the patent or its prosecution his-
tory create such a dispute.243 The trial judge should act as a filter
and discern whether a question of fact exists concerning claim con-
struction.244 However, the judge should invoke the jury when there
is a genuine dispute as to the meaning of a claim.2 4 For example, a
genuine dispute may arise by introducing evidence that a disputed
claim term has a special technical meaning to one of ordinary skill
fence encroaches will be clear.
240. See supra Parts III.C.1, III.D.
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50, 56 (listing the rules for judgment as a matter of law in
actions tried by jury and summary judgment, respectively); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 849 (D. Del. 1995) (holding that sum-
mary judgment is available in patent cases as in any other type of case).
242. See supra Part III.C.2.
243. See supra Part III.C.2.
244. See Structural Rubber Prods., Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 714
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that the court must discern what material, factual issues ex-
ist).
245. The Court was clearly concerned, stating during oral arguments that the
CAFC's holding in Markman left no discretion to the district court judge, who could
give a narrow jury instruction on the fact question. See United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996) (No. 95-26), available in 1996 WL 12585, at *29-30.
[Vol. 30:1707
THE MARKMAN COURT
in the applicable art.24'
Using current conventional devices is preferable to appropri-
ating the fact finding process to the CAFC. Studies indicate that
certain reforms in the jury system may increase accuracy in deci-
sion-making. These include: (1) allowing jurors to take notes and
maintain exhibit notebooks; (2) allowing jurors to submit written
questions to the judge and to deliberate during the course of the
trial; and (3) using modem technology to give jurors access to tran-
scripts and exhibits to aid in comprehension.2 47 However, use of
the general verdict remains problematic since the jury's interpre-
tation of a patent will not necessarily be ascertainable from a gen-
eral verdict for one of the parties-especially when the jury is de-
ciding both interpretation and infringement issues. Thus, general
verdicts can often confuse the issues, and errors are difficult to de-
tect.248 From a policy standpoint, this makes it difficult for the
public to know just what the patent covers and, in possible future
cases, just what claim construction a jury adopted in an earlier
249case.
An additional consideration with the general verdict is the
complexity and lack of guidance associated with the jury instruc-
tions. After detailed instructions concerning often complex and
subtle legal issues, the jury is set adrift to determine the meaning
of claims in the context of complex technology2 ° Proper proce-
dural safeguards are required to reduce the potential for inaccu-
rate, unreviewable, and inconsistent decisions. 1 1 Two such safe-
guards that are currently available and that preserve the spirit of
the Constitution are special verdicts and special interrogatories.
2. Use of special verdicts and interrogatories
A judge should use special verdicts or special interrogatories
when a genuine evidentiary dispute exists2 2 and extrinsic evidence
246. The evidence must also be consistent with the patent and the prosecution his-
tory to be relevant.
247. See THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 18-20 (1992).
248. See infra Part IV.D.2.
249. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(allowing a jury to return a general verdict leaves a great deal of uncertainty on re-
view).
250. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 208, at 20-5-1 to 20-5-4 (listing examples of
patent infringement jury instructions).
251. See ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 180, at 109-10.
252. For example, a genuine evidentiary dispute exists when both sides produce
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is required. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the
use of special verdicts or special interrogatories in civil cases." 3
Further, the Manual for Complex Litigation notes that special
verdicts or interrogatories accompanying a general verdict "help
the jury focus on the issues, reduce the length and complexity of
the instructions, and minimize the need for, or scope of, retrial in
the event of reversible error."2' Special verdicts and interrogato-
ries will also be useful when the court presents some issues to the
jury while reserving others for itself.25
Special verdicts require a jury to return an answer in the form
of a special written finding upon each issue of fact.26 The instruc-
tions are less complex since it is only necessary to give the julry
substantive legal guidance concerning the submitted questions.2
The Seventh Circuit issued an en banc decision that recommended
the CAFC use special verdicts in patent jury trials25 The court
explained that because only issues of fact underlying the legal
question are within the province of the jury, the jury should articu-
late its resolution of those issues in special verdicts. 
9
Special interrogatories are specific fact questions related to a
verdict, which are submitted to a jury along with a general ver-
dict.260 The court will give all explanations necessary to enable the
jury to answer the interrogatories and render a general verdict.26'
If the answers and the general verdict conflict, the court can enter
judgment notwithstanding the general verdict or require the jury
to give further consideration of its answers.262
Both of these methods provide narrow, fact-specific questions
to the jury. This helps to ensure rational and reviewable jury de-
terminations by dividing the factual issues into discrete questions,
which provide a proper record for review on appeal. As one court
noted, "[t]he trial of a patent case, in which the judge and jury per-
credible evidence concerning a claim's meaning that is consistent with the patent and
prosecution history.
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
254. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.633 (3d ed. 1995).
255. See id.
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
257. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1948).
258. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1340 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (citing Dual Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th
Cir. 1980)).
259. See id.
260. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
261. See id.
262. See id.
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form appropriate functions and which provides a record that
clearly delineates the basis for the decision, not only would allay
these concerns, but is also the right of litigants., 263 Thus, through
the use of special verdicts and interrogatories, the court can ac-
complish its goals of uniformity, certainty, and predictability while
still satisfying the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Before accepting the elitist, antidemocratic notions of juror in-
feriority, the CAFC and the Supreme Court should consider care-
fully whether the issue of claim construction is one of fact and
whether removal of the jury would violate the spirit of the Consti-
tution's Seventh Amendment. The Markman decision dismissed
questions of fact as nonexistent, or too rare to bother with, while
failing to address whether the jury must participate substantively
in the claim construction process. While wrestling with uniformity,
the decision trampled the constitutional boundary drawn by the
Founding Fathers between judge and jury and between district and
appellate courts.
Claim construction is a matter of law. However, underlying
factual questions may exist, especially when extrinsic evidence is
required. Allowing the trial judge to submit the narrow fact ques-
tion to the jury would be consistent with the Seventh Amend-
ment's requirement that a jury settle questions of fact. The spirit
of the Constitution is also violated if no meaningful decision is left
for the jury after the claim construction process. Furthermore, the
Founding Fathers intended the jury trial to act as a check on the
federal judiciary's power. For the issue of claim construction, de
novo review allows virtually unchecked power to reside within the
CAFC.
Furthering uniformity in the interpretation of patents is a wor-
thy goal. However, a single judge is not necessarily more compe-
tent than the collective wisdom of twelve lay jurors to decide the
narrow factual questions that arise at trial. In addition, the right to
a jury trial is a constitutional right and should not be diminished
because the court believes itself better suited to find technological
facts.
Current conventional methods, such as special verdicts and
special interrogatories, allow submission of narrow fact questions
263. Structural Rubber Prods., 749 F.2d at 718.
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to the jury, thus satisfying the Seventh Amendment while also
providing uniformity. These methods avoid the disruption of the
trial process, reduce interlocutory appeals pertaining to claim con-
struction, and maintain the proper balance between the trial and
appellate court.
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